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As the author observes in the introduction to this book, "preoccupa-
tion with the insanity defense" has produced "a voluminous literature,
beginning in the nineteenth century and reaching near-torrential pro-
portions in the twentieth." Nevertheless, "despite the age and the in-
tensity of the debate," Professor Goldstein regards the present as an
opportune moment to add to the "thousands of pages" already devoted
to the subject-a judgment which is fully justified in the result. His
contribution is informed, concise, and original, as well as eminently
readable, commendably free from jargon, and scrupulously docu-
mented.
At the very outset the author acknowledges that the insanity defense
(broadly defined as governing "the extent to which men accused of
crime may be relieved of criminal responsibility by virtue of mental
disease") is part of the tradition which makes the notion of "blame" or
"desert" an essential element in any criminal conviction. If it were not
for the importance attached to mens rea, and in consequence to the
punitive character of criminal proceedings, it would not matter
whether the actus reus was committed by a person of sound or un-
sound mind. At the same time the defense itself has not been static,
but has had to be "as variable in purpose as the concept of crime it-
self," accommodating itself first to a criminal law which was primarily
retributive, then to "one which tried to put retribution aside in favor
of deterrence, and, more recently, in favor of rehabilitation." Today,
however, when single-function theories of the criminal process are no
longer acceptable, and when psychiatry is playing havoc with tradi-
tional notions of guilt, a clamorous demand has arisen for the rules of
the insanity defense to be reformulated in the light of "the insights of
modem psychology."
Professor Goldstein does not think such reformulation necessary.
He goes along with "modern psychology" so far as to agree with the
critics of the McNaghten rule that a purely cognitive test of insanity is
inadequate. But he is emphatic that portraying McNaghten "as rigid
and narrow and condemning it wholesale would seem ... to be unjus-
tified." He is able, moreover, to cite as evidence that McNaghten is, in
practice, often given a liberal interpretation. Thus the word "know"
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can be understood in more than a narrowly intellectual sense to in-
clude emotional appreciation of the true significance of an act, and
realisation of its consequences with "full emotional clarity"; and a
judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is quoted to the effect
that if the testimony
had sufficiently tended to prove that at the time of the offense,
defendant was subject to a compulsion or irresistible impulse by
reason of the abnormality of his brain, the testimony should have
been admitted. Even under the right-wrong test no evidence
should be excluded which reasonably tends to show the mental
condition of the defendant at the time of the offense.
So also the phrase "the nature and quality of the act" need not be con-
strued as referring only to the physical characteristics of conduct. Psy-
chiatrists are regularly allowed to testify to their own interpretations,
and in no American jurisdiction are juries told that they must put a
narrow construction on any of the terms of the McNaghten formula.
Moreover, psychiatrists have their own way of escaping from any Mc-
Naghten dilemma. Those among them who believe that the equation
of insanity and psychosis has results which "may be contrary to law but
which are justified by a higher moral obligation" adopt the simple de-
vice of answering "no" to McNaghten questions even when they be-
lieve a "yes" is required. This is called sacrificing "honesty" in order
that "psychiatric truth" shall carry the day. In short, as Professor Gold-
stein sees it, the trouble is that both lawyers and psychiatrists insist on
this identification of insanity with psychosis, the former because they
believe insanity to be a medical entity, and the latter because they be-
lieve that nothing but psychosis will satisfy the law's requirements. If
only the lawyers would reject the stereotyped view of the insanity de-
fense and begin to play a "more aggressive role," the "nagging ques-
tions" about McNaghten would soon be answered.
Lawyers, of course, can play highly sophisticated tricks with lan-
guage; but how far lay juries can follow them is more doubtful. It is,
therefore, hardly surprising that in a number of states (as also in the
federal jurisdiction) an additional clause has been tacked on to the
McNaghten language questionnaire to cover emotional abnormalities
resulting in loss of self-control as well as cognitive deficiencies. Al-
though Professor Goldstein is clearly sympathetic with the objective of
these additions, he dislikes the use of the term "irresistible impulse"
in this connection on the ground that it may be understood to imply
surrender to a sudden urge, whereas loss of the capacity for self-control
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due to mental disease ought equally to be a defense to crimes that have
been carefully planned in advance. If these words are retained, Pro-
fessor Goldstein would tell the jury that an "impulse may be the result
of long . . . brooding and reflection"; he himself, however, would
prefer to drop all reference to "impulse" and to refer simply to "con-
trol" in phrasing such rules.
In short, the McNaghten rules if properly interpreted and perhaps
supplemented by a "control test," are not, in the author's judgment,
the villains of the piece. Nor does he think that the invention of alter-
natives--notably the much-vaunted Durham formula-has done much
to improve matters. "Durham's principal contribution has been less as
a 'solution' to the insanity problem than as a dramatic demonstration
that there are no solutions." Simple as the formula sounds, it leaves
the jury to wrestle with the definition of mental disease (and this at a
time when psychiatrists and sociologists are subjecting the concept to
"withering attack"), and also with the no less elusive problem of how
a crime can be said to be the "product" of such a disease. Even the
recommendation of the American Law Institute's Model Code (al-
ready adopted in five states and two federal circuits), although praised
by Professor Goldstein as a "modernized and much improved rendi-
tion of McNaghten and the 'control' tests," does not shake his conclu-
sion that the various tests do not really differ much one from another,
and that liberalisation is as likely to come through more flexible inter-
pretation of the old rules as through invention of new ones.
The author will not, however, allow us to jump to the conclusion
that that is the end of the matter, or that every offender who can le-
gitimately plead not guilty on account of insanity will in fact be tried
and acquitted on that ground. About 90 per cent of all those charged
with criminal offenses plead guilty, and among these there must be
many mentally sick persons who could properly advance a defense of
insanity. But defendants who are unrepresented by counsel, as many
have been hitherto, may well leave the issue unnoticed and untried;
and those who do plead insanity encounter formidable procedural ob-
stacles. Thus, if they are "indigent" persons, they are handicapped by
not being able to employ their "own" psychiatrists, as the well-to-do
would as a matter of course. Even in those states which provide for
psychiatrists to be employed by the court itself, so as to avoid the "bat-
tle of experts," the defendant runs the risk that the evidence of the
supposedly impartial expert may support the prosecutor's case, in
which event he is left without any psychiatrist to speak for him at all.
Since Professor Goldstein would deny that there can be any such thing
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as impartiality in matters as controversial as those that are likely to be
raised in an insanity defense, he rejects court-appointed psychiatrists
as a panacea. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that even the law's
presumption of sanity in the absence of evidence to the contrary
amounts to a weighting of the scales against those who would plead
insanity. The reason for this presumption, he says, is not that it is
"demonstrable that most offenders are sane," but that judges prefer to
"err on the side of a policy which imposes criminal responsibility."
Again, many possible candidates for the insanity defense never get
to court at all. Even in states where the police are required by statute
to prosecute all crimes coming to their notice, they exercise in fact a
wide discretion in deciding whether an apparent offender should be
ignored, or directed to a "helping" agency or dealt with by some form
of civil commitment; and if a policeman decides not to charge some-
one whom he regards as insane, he is in effect "determining at the out-
set the very questions that the insanity defense is designed to reach at
a later stage."
The ranks of those who plead insanity are, moreover, reduced still
further by the expectation that success will only result in indefinite
incarceration in a mental hospital. Nor can the accused be confident
that he will be treated no differently in such a hospital from those who
are detained as the result of civil commitment. "When the patient has
been committed after a charge of serious crime . . . the medical aspects
of the problem are inevitably affected by the public or 'legal' aspects of
the case." "Psychiatrists will be sorely tempted to 'play it safe' and to
wait out the years, giving greater weight to nonmedical considerations
than would be the case if a criminal charge had not been involved."
Continued restraint in fact ceases to be therapeutic and becomes a
"device for preventive detention," a "way of protecting society from
the risk that new crimes will be committed by the patients upon their
release." As a safeguard against such excessive caution, Professor Gold-
stein clearly inclines to the view that, exceptional cases apart, deten-
tion for "treatment" should not continue beyond the limit of the sen-
tence which might have been imposed had no question of insanity
been raised. In other words the insane ought to enjoy the benefit, even
if they do not suffer the rigors, of the criminal law.
From all this it is only too apparent that, in spite of all the thou-
sands of pages written on the subject and of all the ingenuity devoted
to the formulation of new rules, no clear and logical defensible line
has yet been drawn between the wicked and the weak-minded; nor
can we be confident that the insanity defense protects anywhere near
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all those who might reasonably claim, even under the law as it now
stands, to be outside the permissible reach of penal measures.
In Britain, the boundary between the criminal and the medical is
no less confused. A defendant dealt with under any one of three rele-
vant statutes may find himself part patient, part criminal. Thus, under
the Criminal Justice Act of 1948 an obligation to undergo either resi-
dential or non-residential mental treatment may be written into a
probation order (the terms of which in any case require the subject's
consent). To that extent the probationer is transformed into a patient.
Rather surprisingly, no specific diagnosis is required: all that is neces-
sary is that the offender's mental condition should appear to the court,
on the evidence of only one medical practitioner experienced in the
diagnosis of mental disorders, to be such as requires and may be sus-
ceptible to treatment. The number of cases dealt with in this way in-
creases very slowly year by year: in 1966 the total stood at 1,348, which
is only about 2 per cent of all the probation orders made in that
year. What is interesting, however, is that probation conditioned upon
mental treatment is by no means confined to sexual or violent offend-
ers. In 1966, 440 persons convicted of larceny and 184 convicted of
house- or shop-breaking were required to undergo mental treatment as
a condition of their probation, as against 161 persons convicted of
either homosexual or heterosexual offenses and 42 convicted of assault
or malicious wounding. History does not relate just what peculiarities
may have induced the court to prefer medical to strictly penal treat-
ment in cases of offenses against property; but, whatever his crime, the
probationer who fails to conform to this or any other term of his pro-
bation can be brought back to court and punished for his original of-
fense. His status as a patient is thus contingent upon good behavior,
and any lapse may result in his return to the ranks of the criminal, and
to a substitution of penal for medical treatment.
It is, however, in the diminished responsibility clause of the 1957
Homicide Act that the most determined effort has been made to escape
from what was felt to be the McNaghten straitjacket. Under Section 2
of this Act a charge of murder can be reduced to manslaughter if the
defendant can establish that he was suffering from "such abnormality
of mind... as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his
acts." Impaired responsibility is not, of course, in itself a disease
known to medical science, so the door is left wide open for evidence to
be adduced that the defendant's condition was due, in the words of the
Act, to "arrested or retarded development of mind," to "any inherent
causes" or "to disease or injury." A successful defense on these lines is
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enormously more appealing than an old-style plea of insanity, inas-
much as a manslaughter verdict leaves the court complete discretion
as to sentence, which can range from life imprisonment to absolute
discharge; whereas indefinite detention during "Her Majesty's plea-
sure" is the inevitable result of a verdict of insanity. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that diminished responsibility has practically ousted
insanity in murder cases. In 1956, the last year before the Homicide
Act came into force, 32 people were convicted of murder, while 18
were found to be "guilty but insane" (as the "special" verdict was then
worded). In 1966, 72 persons were found guilty of murder, and only
one was found to be "not guilty by reason of insanity"; but at the same
time 51 others were convicted of manslaughter under the diminished
responsibility section of the Act.
A term so vague as "diminished responsibility" has naturally been
stretched to cover all manner of diametrically opposite conditions. In
the case of a defendant whose previous record has been impeccable, it
can be argued that his responsibility must have been impaired for him
to commit a crime so far out of character. Alternatively, it may be said
that one who has had a long criminal history dearly never could have
been fully responsible. Even those murderers who might well be re-
garded as exceptionally responsible have managed to creep under the
diminished responsibility umbrella, as when an Army Major, after seri-
ous study of the prognosis for mongolism, decided to smother his
mongoloid baby, and got away with a diminished responsibility man-
slaughter verdict and a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment. It seems,
in fact, that this clause is becoming not so much a means of sifting the
mentally disordered from the fully responsible, as a device, in cases
where there are obvious mitigating circumstances, for dodging the
obligatory sentence of life imprisonment which follows a verdict of
murder. In this connection it is perhaps significant that, in the House
of Lords debate in 1965 on the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty)
Bill, the Lord Chief Justice argued that this obligatory sentence ought
to be abolished, and the distinction between murder and manslaughter
obliterated, so that a Court could impose, in any case of homicide, the
sentence which in all the circumstances appeared to be appropriate. It
was, he said, "a horrifying experience" to have to sentence the per-
petrator of a mercy killing to life imprisonment. Juries also, one
imagines, must be alive to the horror of this experience, and may well
be disposed to clutch at diminished responsibility simply as a means of
avoiding it, and without much regard to relevant psychiatric evidence.
In law, however, anyone convicted under Section 2 of the Homicide
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Act is held to be suffering from an abnormality of mind as the result
of disease, injury or mental retardation, and must therefore be re-
garded as a sick man. But it does not follow that he will be treated as
such. On the contrary, he stands a good chance of being sent to prison
either for life or for a specified term like any responsibly guilty crimi-
nal. Until the end of 1960 this could perhaps have been justified on
the ground that no obvious alternative was available; but since that
date it has been open to the Court to make a hospital order instead of
passing sentence. Yet between 1961 and 1966 the proportion of dimi-
nished responsibility cases in which a hospital order has been substi-
tuted for a sentence has never exceeded 60 per cent and in some years
has been as low as 42 per cent; the others, with few exceptions, were
sent to prison. Of those imprisoned a few have subsequently been
transferred by order of the Home Secretary to mental hospitals; but of
99 such prisoners, only 12 have been thus dealt with.
The third statute which seeks to direct the mentally disordered into
medical rather than penal channels is the 1959 Mental Health Act,
which confers on any criminal court the power already mentioned to
substitute a hospital order for a sentence. This power is a limited one,
however, inasmuch as (1) it applies only to offenses for which a sentence
of imprisonment could be imposed and (2) an order can only be made
on the recommendation of two doctors, one of whom must have special
experience in the diagnosis or treatment of mental disorders, and (3)
arrangements for the patient's admission must have been made with a
named hospital before the order is made. Moreover, in contrast with
both the hospitalization provisions of the Criminal Justice Act and the
Homicide Act, a specific diagnosis must be recorded under one of four
headings: mental disease, subnormality, severe subnormality, or psycho-
pathic disorder. Incidentally, this last category, though to date narrowly
interpreted in practice, is defined in extremely broad terms as a "per-
sistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-
normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or
seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the patient, and requires
or is susceptible to medical treatment"-subject only to the provisos
that no one can be pronounced to be suffering from any mental dis-
order "by reason only of promiscuity or other immoral conduct," and
that a psychopath must be diagnosed before he is 21, and cannot ordi-
narily be detained after he reaches the age of 25.
Once a hospital order has been made, the subject's status officially
becomes that of a patient. Even so, however, his position differs from
that of patients compulsorily hospitalized under civil procedure. The
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offender does not have the right to apply to a Mental Health Tribunal
for his release, nor can his nearest relatives at any time demand that his
detention be terminated. Moreover, the court which imposes a hospi-
tal order also has the power to add a restriction order of either indefi-
nite or specified duration, during the currency of which the patient
may not be released without the Home Secretary's consent. This last
power clearly has nothing to do with the subject's medical condition
and virtually turns the hospital order into a sentence. In any case the
idea that a Court can forecast better than the doctors who are in con-
tinuous charge of his case whether a patient will be fit to be returned
to the community five, ten or fifteen years ahead is patently absurd.
With one accord the critics of the McNaghten formula have directed
their fire against its exclusively cognitive standard and its consequent
failure to take account of crimes which are due to deficiencies not
merely of understanding, but of self-control. This, they say, is tanta-
mount to ignoring the "insights of modern psychology." Professor
Goldstein differs from the inventors of rival formulae in contending
that McNaghten would be all right as it stands, if only we could make
up our minds to interpret it more liberally; but his objective is funda-
mentally the same as that of all the other critics. Indeed, writing of
the early days of the insanity defense, he states categorically that "it
was apparent then, as it is now, that there were people who could not
control their conduct because they could not respond adequately to
what they knew about consequences."
What, however, I think has been insufficiently appreciated is that a
volitional test raises practical difficulties far more formidable even than
those involved in a purely cognitive formula. I am not suggesting that
the McNaghten test, interpreted (as most laymen would surely under-
stand it) in strictly cognitive terms is free from ambiguities, or that it
is an adequate instrument for distinguishing between the sane and the
mentally disordered. But it is clear that in certain circumstances the
limits of a man's knowledge and understanding can be convincingly
demonstrated. Thus, if I am asked to translate a passage from Japanese
into English it is indisputable that this is beyond my powers: everyone
knows that merely trying harder will not make me any more successful.
But if I assert that I have an uncontrollable impulse to break shop win-
dows, in the nature of the case no proof of uncontrollability can be
adduced. All that is known is that the impulse was not in fact con.
trolled; and it is perfectly legitimate to hold the opinion that, had I
tried a little harder, I might have conquered it. It is indeed apparent
that some people, such as sadistic sexual perverts, suffer from tempta-
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tions from which others are immune. But the fact that an impulse is
unusual is no proof that it is irresistible. In short, it is not only difficult
to devise a test of volitional competence the validity of which can be
objectively established: it is impossible.
Why then retain the insanity defense at all? Toward the end of his
book Professor Goldstein raises this question. "Why not," he asks, "sub-
stitute a system in which the courts decide only whether the offending
act has occurred-and then pass the offender to a 'treatment tribunal'
which will take his mental condition into account in determining what
is to be done with him?" In any case the procedural difficulties are such
that only a small proportion of the mentally sick ever avail themselves
of the defense: moreover, "there is little purpose in trying to assess
'blame' because the factors which move a man to crime are too various
and too unfathomable."
These arguments are so forcefully put by Professor Goldstein that I
for one was convinced that he must be going to come down in favor
of them. But no! Having come right up to the fence he swerves away
and refuses to take the jump. His final conclusion is that, "despite the
superficial plausibility" of the abolitionist proposal, "there are a great
many objections to it." In the first place the attempts of the only juris-
dictions which have tried to separate the offending act from the mental
state of the offender have been singularly unsuccessful if not unconsti-
tutional. Second,
the proposal tends to sweep past the jury and toward the sen-
tencing stage large numbers of "offenders" who would now go
free, because they lacked mens rea, on the assumption that they
would be weeded out by the "treatment tribunal." Experience
suggests, however, that prematurely labelling a person an "of-
fender" is more likely than any other single factor to confirm him
in a criminal career.
Third, and most fundamental, "eliminating the insanity defense
would remove from the criminal law and the public conscience the
vitally important distinction between illness and evil, or would tuck
it away in an administrative process."
The first of these arguments is obviously inconclusive, at least for
those who are not bound by the terms of the American Constitution.
The second, I must confess, I find very difficult to understand. Surely
it is not true that large numbers of "offenders" who would now go free,
because they lacked mens rea, would be swept past the jury to be sen-
tenced by a treatment tribunal. Professor Goldstein himself has re-
peatedly emphasized that mentally disordered people who are ac-
1027
The Yale Law Journal
quitted on the grounds of insanity do not go free, but are normally
committed to mental institutions for indefinite periods.
Clearly the root of the matter is to be found in the third objection.
The "vitally important distinction between illness and evil," writes
Professor Goldstein, would be blurred. The "emphasis on whether an
offender is sick or bad helps to keep alive the almost forgotten drama
of individual responsibility .... In short, even if we have misgivings
about blaming a particular individual, because he has been shaped long
ago by forces he may no longer be able to resist, the concept of 'blame'
may be necessary." Thus in the end Professor Goldstein comes back to
the point at which he started. Blame, it seems, is essential "as a spur to
individual responsibility." The basic purpose of the criminal law is to
assign blame to those who deserve it, and the function of the insanity
defense is to sort out those whose mental condition should render them
exempt from blame. Thus legal orthodoxy prevails in the end.
The law, of course, always requires clear-cut distinctions. The re-
sponsible and sane stand on one side of the line, the irresponsible or
insane on the other: every single defendant mut be appropriately classi-
fied. Yet natura non facit saltum: in reality we are all strung out along
a continuum which reaches from the most responsible to the most hope-
lessly weak-willed and weak-minded; and in many cases the degree of
our responsibility almost certainly varies from time to time in accor-
dance with our circumstances or physiological condition. In short, the
"vital distinction between illness and evil" is anything but dear-cut.
Indeed the worst feature of all the formulae that have been tried-
McNaghten, Durham, British Homicide Act, or what have you-is
their insistence on a hard and fast and totally unrealistic line between
the sheep and the goats. Anyone who has followed trials in which this
issue has been raised will be well aware of the sophisticated forensic
subtleties for which it offers opportunity. Is careful planning of a crime
consistent with diminished responsibility? Is it possible that a man
should be fully responsible when he seizes a stick in the entrance to a
house, but only partially so when he uses it to beat an old gentleman
in bed upstairs? In these and the many similar examples which can be
culled from trials in which the defendant's mens rea is in issue, all con-
tact with reality seems to have been lost.
Clearly the only way to avoid getting entangled in these niceties
and absurdities is to demote the concept of blame from its dominant
position in the criminal process. If we could emancipate ourselves from
the deep-rooted tradition that the basic function of the criminal law
is to identify and punish wickedness, all this farcical hairsplitting about
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the limits of mental abnormality could be done away with. Questions
of the accused's mental condition could be ignored in the actual trial,
the purpose of which would be to establish responsibility in a purely
physical sense for the actus reus without reference to the presence, or
absence, of malicious intent. Mfens rea would thus no longer be written
into the definition of every crime. Only after the accused's physical
responsibility for a forbidden action had been proved would it be per-
missible to inquire into his mental condition, in order to determine
how best he could be dealt with. In other words an offender's state of
mind would be regarded as relevant, not to the measure of his guilt, or
to the crime of which he should be convicted, but to the choice of the
treatment most appropriate to his case.
Although he dearly regards development along these lines as the
least desirable of various possible alternatives, Professor Goldstein
makes a somewhat cryptic reference, at the end of his chapter on Com-
peting Defenses, to the possibility of "legislative effort" to expand "the
number of crimes which abandon mens rea and which impose strict
liability on the offender." Regrettably, however, he does not pursue
the theme beyond a single sentence. Yet is it not inevitable that the
complications which modem psychiatry has introduced into traditional
notions of guilt, and the total failure of psychiatrists to produce any
criteria for distinguishing between wickedness and weakness of mind
which can be empirically validated-is it not inevitable that these
trends must sooner or later take all the stuffing out of mens rea?
Hitherto, of course, strict liability has generally been restricted to
such statutory offenses as are generally regarded as of minor impor-
tance. In such cases disregard of mens rea is defended on the dual
ground, first, that the number of these offenses is so enormous that life
is simply not long enough to inquire in every case into the accused's
motivation or mental state (imagine what would happen, for example,
in a busy city court which disposes of some 300 parking offenses in a
morning if proof of mens rea were required in every casel); and, second,
that in any case these offenses are not "truly criminal" and do not in-
volve any serious "moral turpitude."
Yet could not an equally compelling argument be made the other
way round; i.e., in favor of eliminating the requirement of mens rea
from particularly grave offenses such as homicide or rape? Crimes such
as these are just as damaging to their victims whether they are the
result of calculated wickedness or of insane delusions. Is it not, there-
fore, proper that anyone who is suspected of having committed such an
actus reus should be liable to answer for it in a criminal court, what-
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ever the state of his mind-so long, that is, as he is not too ill to be able
to instruct counsel or to understand court proceedings?
Already there are precedents-occasional exceptions to the rule that
mens rea is a necessary element in all but minor offenses. Take, for
example, the crime known to English law as causing death by danger-
ous driving. Of the two elements in this offense-dangerous driving
and causing death-the first certainly involves no element of intent,
while on the issue of negligence the authorities are more than a little
confused.' It may, however, be presumed that juries would be reluctant
to convict a driver who had not been at fault in any way at all. As to
the second element in this offense-that of causing death-there can
hardly be any question of intent here. In any case, a driver who delib-
erately drove at someone, intending to kill or injure him, would more
likely be charged with murder than with a motoring offense. Never-
theless, the offense of causing death by dangerous driving is regarded
as sufficiently serious to be triable only at Assizes.
That a crime in which intent is virtually absent should rank so high
in the criminal calendar is remarkable. Its presence there, I suggest, is
explained by a peculiarity of the modern industrial world which has
no parallel in simpler societies-that is, the fact that more social
damage is attributable to negligence, carelessness and indifference than
to deliberate wickedness. An obvious illustration is the contrast be-
tween the number of persons killed on the roads with the number of
deaths due to other forms of homicide. In Britain in 1965 nearly 8,000
persons suffered fatal injuries in road accidents, and more than 1,000
additional deaths were due to accidents in industry; whereas the total
known to have been killed by murder, manslaughter and infanticide
put together was only just over 200. Roughly the same pattern will be
found in any "advanced" industrial society.
There may well be a moral here. For if homicides generally were
dealt with on the same basis, that is to say, with as little attention to
mens rea, as death caused by dangerous driving, the interminable quest
for a reliable criterion by which to distinguish bad from sick could
at least be abandoned. We should recognize this distinction for the will-
o'-the-wisp that it is, and we should at least be relieved of the impos.
sible task of deciding whether a defendant could or could not have
acted otherwise than as he did.
Professor Goldstein, however, cannot get away from the idea that the
1. See Williams, Absolute Liability in Traffic Offenses (pts. 1 & 2), 1967 Caim. L, R-V.
(Eng.), 143, 194.
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Court's primary function is to pronounce moral judgments and to ap-
portion blame. "The heart of the distinction between conviction and
acquittal by reason of insanity," he writes, "lies in the fact that the
former represents official condemnation." Yet he has immediately to
admit that the practical importance of this distinction is weakened by
the fact that "the acquittal is itself a sanction, bringing with it com-
parable stigma and the prospect of indeterminate detention"; and he
argues that the choice between the two sanctions ought to be left to
a jury rather than to experts "because the public can identify with the
former but not with the latter . . . . Once the distinction between
'blame' and compassion has been made, decisions as to disposition
should be made by those who are professionally qualified."
Blame and compassion are not, however, mutually exclusive. The
unreal pretense that they are is simply a concession to the supposedly
punitive character of the criminal law. Obviously, if the essential
purpose of a criminal court is to punish the blameworthy as they de-
serve, the compassionworthy must be rescued from its clutches. But,
were this obsession with the punitive once dispelled, the courts could
be free to deal with every lawbreaker in whatever way, consonant with
the moral standards of the community, seemed best calculated to dis-
courage future lawbreaking. Their eyes would be on the future, not
on the past. Nor need they be bound by rigid diagnostic categories. In
this connection there may be something to be learned from the terms
already quoted of Section 4 of the British Criminal Justice Act of 1948
under which mental treatment can be prescribed without any evidence
of specific mental disorder, provided only that the court is persuaded
by appropriate medical evidence that such treatment offers the best
prospect of "improvement of the offender's mental condition."
It follows logically that, once the practice of classifying offenders into
the wicked and the weak-minded is abandoned, the similar distinction
between prisons and hospitals becomes equally inappropriate. Already
hybrid institutions, such as Grendon Underwood in Britain and similar
establishments in the United States, are beginning to make their ap-
pearance; and suggestions that the courts should simply pass "cus-
todial" sentences without specifying under what conditions, penal or
medical, this sentence is to be served are much in the air, and much to
be commended. Obviously, in the case of sentences of any considerable
duration, the court is in no position to forecast what kind of regime
will be best suited to an offender several years ahead. Hence the need
for a variety of institutions and for easy transfer from one to another
without inhibiting labels, at the discretion of those who are in con-
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tinuous touch with persons under detention. Nor must this be read
as merely a plea for the "soft" treatment of offenders. If the weaker
vessels need the protection of a kindly environment, there are others
for whom a more demanding regime is certainly indicated; and the
response of a single individual to different types of treatment is not
necessarily constant throughout his history.
In a world as deeply traditionalist as that of the law, there can be no
question of sudden radical change. The crucial issue is to determine
the direction in which we are, or should be, travelling.
Here the choice is plain. We can continue to define and redefine the
limits of responsibility in an attempt to keep pace with the increasingly
subtle pronouncements of psychiatry. In that event, if past experience
is anything to go by, the ranks of the blameless will be steadily ex-
panded; and, paradoxically the decision, at any given moment, as to
an individual's personal guilt will be contingent upon the contempo-
rary state of medical science. The guilty of today may, a generation
later, be safely bracketed with the blameless. Alternatively, the crim-
inal courts may shift their gaze from past guilt to future prospects, and
may come to see themselves as agencies for the prevention of criminal
behavior.
Such a function would, I imagine, be dismissed by Professor Gold-
stein as "social engineering"-which prompts the reflection that per-
haps the fundamental difference between us is that to him this term
appears to carry pejorative overtones.
BARUBARA WoorroNt
Twenty Letters to a Friend. By Svetlana Alliluyeva (tr. by
Priscilla Johnson McMillan). New York: Harper & Row,
1967. Pp. 246. $5.95.
Miss Stalin both demonstrates and helps to perpetuate one of the
myths of the modern world, the belief that the explanation of what is
puzzling on the public stage lies in the realm of private life. There is a
small grain of truth here. Sometimes a man's relations with his wife or
friends may suggest a new light in which to see his actions as a revolu-
tionary or a statesman. But in general what is crucial in the relation-
ship of private to public life is the irrelevance of the one to the other.
t Baroness of Abinger. Deputy Speaker, House of Lords.
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